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Finance and capital markets
Course: Finance and capital markets > Unit 10
Lesson 4: Paulson bailout- CNN: Understanding the crisis
- Bailout 1: Liquidity vs. solvency
- Bailout 2: Book value
- Bailout 3: Book value vs. market value
- Bailout 4: Mark-to-model vs. mark-to-market
- Bailout 5: Paying off the debt
- Bailout 6: Getting an equity infusion
- Bailout 7: Bank goes into bankruptcy
- Bailout 8: Systemic risk
- Bailout 9: Paulson's plan
- Bailout 10: Moral hazard
- Bailout 11: Why these CDOs could be worth nothing
- Bailout 12: Lone Star transaction
- Bailout 13: Does the bailout have a chance of working?
- Bailout 14: Possible solution
- Bailout 15: More on the solution
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Bailout 15: More on the solution
More on the "Plutsky Plan". Created by Sal Khan.
Want to join the conversation?
- Too bad I only dicovered this site last week, now I have a question about this alternative solution, how would you avoid a potential bank run and If you let all this banks to go under what would happend with all the depositors savings and their money in their checking accounts. I know that this question is 2 years late, but if somebody have the answer I'll apreciate the feedback.(4 votes)
- The FDIC does not have enough money to protect all depositors. In fact, it can only cover a small percentage of total deposits (somewhere around or below 1% I believe but not sure). It also has the ability to borrow money from the treasury, but as with most government programs it ultimately only has the capacity to redistribute wealth as opposed to creating it, and therefore is limited to protecting a (relative) few individuals. If it were to insure all deposits, it could only do so by borrowing massive amounts of money (for which tax-payers would ultimately be accountable) or by receiving newly printed moneys, thus depreciating the US' FRN's (federal reserve note) value.
Incidentally, one of the issues with deposit insurance is that it does not solve the underlying problems which would cause bank runs. Therefore, the funds available for insurance will diminish but the risk of bank runs will remain the same, all else remaining equal. Its existence is dependent upon the hope that most banks will survive. In any case, it's a very limited 'insurance'.
Here are a couple of quick quotes pertaining to the FDIC, from Wiki:
"The fund is mandated by law to keep a balance equivalent to 1.15 percent of insured deposits."
"According to the FDIC.gov website (as of January 2009), "FDIC deposit insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government". This means that the resources of the United States government stand behind FDIC-insured depositors."[35] The statutory basis for this claim is less than clear. Congress, in 1987, passed a non-binding "Sense of Congress" to that effect,[36] but there appear to be no laws strictly binding the government to make good on any insurance liabilities unmet by the FDIC."
So you might infer from this the FDIC's rather precarious nature.(8 votes)
- Around "" you talk about the printing press. Isn't this actually the main issue? Because banks can lend out with leverage they earn a lot of interest. Money they use to lend out and earn more interest. This function is creating new money without making the 'Goods and services pie' bigger? 6:30
I cannot understand how the Fiat currency of a Federal Reserve can be sustainable long-term.(2 votes)- But Brent, where does the farmer's corn go? It does not disappear when paid to the logger. The logger can then use it to hire an apprentice to help him cut wood. Thus, he can make two loans of wood to his neighbors in the coming winter, rather than just one.
What are the tangible positive effects of this loan? 1) He provided a livelihood for his apprentice all summer and that man has not starved. 2) He can keep twice as many neighbors from freezing to death in the coming winter. 3) His loans in the coming winter are supposed to bring him similar returns, allowing him to continue expanding his logging operation, feeding more people and keeping more neighbors from freezing.
The standing of living of everyone improves thanks to this logger's prudent lending practices and his debtors' ability to repay him. This is the idea of "growing the pie".
Now if he chooses not to loan the farmer some logs, then the farmer will die in the snow of the winter. The logger will starve while the farmer's fields lay bare in the summer. Then there is no pie for either of them.
Similarly if the farmer takes the logs and builds furniture for his home (if he mis-allocates the logs), they will each meet the same fate as if the loan not been made.
And if the farmer does not make good on his promise of corn? He had better figure out a way to stay warm all winter once the logger either starves or refuses to do business with him.(5 votes)
- I see where Sal is going with this, it seems like a great idea! My question is, say you have a private bank that has existed for a while like Morgan Stanley (MS). My understanding is that MS has managed to weather the storm, maybe took some hits, but through prudent investment, kept themselves somewhat insulated against these CDOs and other "stinky" assets. Will they be able to compete against these 50 new banks that have pristine balance sheets and tons of liquid equity to lend at low interest to businesses? I would think that the new banks would be able to lend at low interest and would thus attract all sorts of customers to open up lines of credit. Also, whats stopping people from doing a bank run on existing banks so that they can in on the ground floor of the new banks?(4 votes)
- How I understood this video is that the old banks would either disappear or become more slim and efficient to compete with new banks as consequences of their wrong investments in the short term. I think what this video says government should not aid the broken old banks creating artificial demand to save them since this is not doing any good for economy. So I'm assuming that a lot of the old banks would not be able to compete well since they have all the bad deteriorating assets and there is no need to stop people to pursue their best interest.(1 vote)
- I am almost 60 and I have never seen a reduction in the price of goods and services. Granted I've seen interest rates go down but never retail price reductions. Can anyone explain why this is the case?(2 votes)
- With all due respect, the price of many retail goods go down all the time. Twenty-five years ago, I was buying a modest current-gen computer system (with a monitor and software) for around $1200, and nowadays you can get the same thing for more like $400. (Obviously, it's even more profound if you track goods that are actually equivalent. A computer as powerful as that $400 system twenty-five years ago would have cost millions.) I think you'll see the same thing across the entire range of consumer electronics.
Even some services have reduced in price as automation has reduced costs. How much did it cost to have a broker execute a stock trade thirty years ago -- nowadays you can even do it for free under many cirucumstances.(3 votes)
- Sal,
There's one problem with this plan you haven't addressed. What about the millions of deposits that ordinary people will loose if you let the big banks go under? What's it going to do to the economy if you have the savings of an entire middle class wiped out?
I think there must be a backstopper for this in the form of the Glass-Steagal Act. That separated the commercial banks from the investment banks, insuring that commercial banks couldn't get involved in speculation.(3 votes) - What does "Leverage" in your video mean ? I often think of it as Loan - Down Payment ratio, but in this video I suppose you talk about the 10-90 rule for banks - 10% Reserve and 90% Lent out.(2 votes)
- Leverage is the ratio of the assets you control to the amount of equity you control them with, so in this case the leverage is 10:1 because the bank has 140B of assets (in loans) that it controls with 14B of equity. :)(2 votes)
- I wonder how much would the FDIC have to pay to depositors if there was a bank run because of the banks being allowed to fail. What about depositors who had deposits more than the FDIC limits? Finally what would have happened if instead of bailing out the banks or instead of the proposal of setting up new banks, these existing banks were nationalized.(2 votes)
- The FDIC insures deposits up to $250,000. Beyond that, the deposits would simply be lost. However, as I wrote to neoalvaro79, the FDIC is strictly limited in its capacity to actually insure deposits.(1 vote)
- Re practicality of the proposed possible solution, isn't competition an issue to be considered, i.e. determining the optimum number of banks that can operate profitably in the US economy? Also, what's the underlying philosophy - still free market idealogy, i.e., let the new banks compete and kill the existing ones if need be? Wha about the impact on their employees and other businesses affected?(2 votes)
- Why is lending of more than 1:1, such as 10:1 or 40:1 allowed? I always thought there is one level of banks and individuals make deposits, the bank then makes loans to individuals and businesses, collects interest and provides a yield for depositors. Why have bank to bank lending? Who does it benefit? Does it benefit the depositors?(1 vote)
- Isn't this plan also a plea to keep investment banks (who play around with derivatives) and commercial credit institutions as completely different entities?(1 vote)
- "Pleas" for good behavior don't work in the US (and I doubt anywhere else). The US Congress has to act to impose some sane regulation on the banks and/or keep large financial institutions from growing to be "too large to fail".(2 votes)
Video transcript
Let's talk a little bit about
what I'll call the Plutsky Plan, because it came from
my friend, Todd Plutsky. But I think it's a good plan. But let's think about a little
bit of its repercussions and see if it's more or less likely
to actually work. Well first of all, you know, I
threw out in the last video 50 banks, maybe that's logistically
difficult. Instead of having 50 banks
with $14 billion initial capital, maybe you do five banks
with $140 forty billion initial capital. But the point being is that you
should have more than one bank, it shouldn't be too big to
fail, and you should try to instill some type of
competition there. But because they have pristine
balance sheets, all of these banks are going to be able to
lever 10:1, which we know isn't crazy. Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley
and all the likes have been leveraging up 30 to 40:1. So 10:1 is normal for a bank. And frankly, they're probably
going to be able to attract a lot more-- you know we said
foreign governments probably would be willing to lend to
them, the private sector is willing to lend to them. If these are commercial banks,
which means that they can take deposits, a lot of people are
going to be willing to essentially put their money with
this bank because it has a clean balance sheet, and
essentially it'll be owned individually by the American
people, and it will have the federal backstop above and
beyond the FDIC insurance limit and all that. Although I do like the
one provision to increase the FDIC caps. Maybe I'll do the insurance
caps on deposits. But it will actually be able
attract a lot of deposits from everyday people. They'll feel safer
with these banks. So in terms of whether you'll
be able to capitalize these banks and lever up 10:1,
I don't think there's an issue there. Then there's a question, will
it solve the fundamental problem of keeping credit
markets flowing to those people that it needs
to keep credit to? Well we already said it'll have
no trouble being able to have access to funds above and
beyond how much the government capitalizes it with. It'll be able to attract
deposits, it'll be able to attract investment from the
private sector and from international money, especially
with this five year government backstop. So it will be able to
essentially put 10 times this money back into the system. So if you take $700 billion
collectively, this will introduce 10 times as much. So $7 trillion of new loans. So this $7 trillion -- I mean
that's literally half of the American GDP. I mean you might argue that is
too much -- that might provide too much credit, and it might go
from, you know, thawing to overheating credit markets. So then you might say well if
$7 trillion is too much liquidity, well why don't we
just reduce this number a little bit. Instead of saying $700 billion,
why don't you make it a $100 billion, right? Because then $100 billion, if
you do 10 banks with $10 billion each, so you introduce
$100 billion. They all lever up because it's
all new liabilities and new assets, clean balance sheets,
it'll introduce $1 trillion of new loans that it can go put
to work for people building factories and doing
real things. And because their incentive is
not to bail out their friends, it's not to help out the
companies they used to work for, the companies that are
donating to them in some way or contributing to them, or
promising jobs in some way. It won't go -- this $1 trillion
is not going to go to buy assets at higher prices
than they should. You know it could go to buy
assets at discount prices if the new managers of these banks
do see a good return. But most probably they'll invest
it in areas of the economy where they do see a
positive return on investment. And one person had sent me a
note and said, hey, wouldn't introducing all of this
liquidity into the financial system, whether it's $7 trillion
or $1 trillion, wouldn't that lead to
hyperinflation? And I'll probably do a whole
series on inflation. I think there's a lot of
misunderstanding around it. In general, if anyone makes a
positive investment -- so if I have $1 and I make it an
investment where it generates $1.20 of benefit, that
by definition is not inflationary. Because I had $1 in the world
and I created $1.20 of wealth. So actually, the pie
gets bigger. A good way to think about
inflation -- I'll do a lot about this because it is a
very abstract concept. Let's say this is the
pie of goods and services in the world. Or let's just say
a country right? Goods and services. Goods and services in a year. You could say it's our
GDP, or however you want to measure it. Goods and services
in a year, right? That's the goods and
services in a year. And let's say I have another
pool of the amount of money there is in a given year. So money. And the money supply is an
interesting thing, because it's not just dependent
on the amount of physical coins or dollars. It also is a function of how
quickly those transact and how much leverage there
is in the system. So you can actually have a whole
economy where everyone just has one dollar bill, but
every time someone needs something from someone
else, they exchange that one dollar bill. So that one dollar bill gets
used, you know, 15 trillion times a year. So you'd actually have $15
trillion of money, because the velocity would be so high. But anyway let's just say that
this is the pool of money. If this pool, the pool of money
grows faster than the actual goods and services and
the actual productive capacity of that country, then
you have inflation. So if this circle grows
faster than this one you have inflation. If this circle grows
faster than this circle, you have deflation. You have the same, or you have
some amount of money representing more goods and
services, so goods and services actually
become cheaper. And the problem that we're
talking about right now, this credit crisis, this is a problem
of deleveraging, where the government injects a dollar
into this current broken banking system, and
instead of that dollar -- you know, the normal system is you
lend a dollar to a bank, so you lend $1 to a bank,
and then, let's say this is the Fed right? This is how they inject
liquidity. They lend a dollar to a bank. Let me draw a bank here. Then that bank has to keep -- it
can only lever 10:1-- so it essentially has to keep in
reserve $0.10 of that dollar, but then it lends $0.90 to
somebody else, to another bank, right? Then that other bank has to keep
10% of that, so it lends $0.81 to someone else. And then that someone else can
lend whatever $0.81 times 0.9 is, so I don't know,
seventy-something cents to someone else. But you get the idea, that in a
normal, functioning banking system, one dollar injected
into the system has this multiplier effect,
so it actually creates a lot of money. And that's what people are
implicitly talking about when they talk about the
printing press. But what's going on right now is
the Fed lends $1 to Bank A, but Bank A is so scared that it
doesn't lend out to anyone else, it just keeps
that dollar. Because right now their main
priority isn't to try to get a little bit of incremental
interest on whatever money they have, their main priority
is survival. So that dollar just goes
into a black hole. And so that's what the
Fed's frustration is. It keeps lending money into
the system but that money keeps disappearing. And actually as the economy
slows, the velocity of money is going to slow down as well. So the main problem when you
have a credit crisis and when you have a recession
is actually the money supply shrinks. The amount of goods and services
probably shrinks as well, but the money supply
shrinks even more. So your main problem
is deflation. And you know, that was the
main problem in the Great Depression, and that was
the main problem in the Japanese crisis. And you know, Ben Bernanke, he's
written papers about this and he's like, well you can
always cure deflation by printing money and dropping
money from a helicopter. Well to some degree that's
what they've already been trying to do. They've already been-- the Fed's
been willing to take pretty large credit risks on
bank and lending money into the system. But the problem is, if this
multiplier effect is disappearing at a faster rate
than you are dropping money from a helicopter, you still
have deflation, right? Before when you not only let
people lever 10:1, you let them lever 30:1 and 40:1, every
dollar you put in the system became $40 that was given
to someone else, and then they could lever up. So you had this huge
explosion of money. And frankly, the only reason why
we didn't have inflation-- I mean the last 5, 10 years
we had this huge explosion of money. And the only reason why it
didn't, at least in measurable inflation, show up, is that
on the other side of the equation, you had all of this
new productive capacity come on line in China and India. And so manufactured goods
got a lot cheaper. But in things that were not
manufactured goods, like commodities, like homes, you had
this huge asset inflation. Or even college tuition, or
healthcare-- things that are dependent on American labor--
became hugely expensive, and that's because you had this
huge, huge infusion-- you know, there's different ways
to measure money, but the broadest indicator, which is
called M3-- and I know I'm kind of going out of the domain,
but I'll make a bunch of videos on this. The broadest indicator, M3,
which the government stopped officially reporting, exploded
because there was so much leverage in the system. Now things are-- the exact
opposite is happening. The leverage is disappearing
from the system. There's no lending
to each other. Everyone is going from 1:30
leverage to 1:10 leverage. So money is actually
disappearing in the system. The velocity is slowing. This is shrinking, but this is
shrinking more, no matter what the Fed is doing. And frankly, this new $700
billion bail out, I personally think this is the helicopter
that Ben Bernanke always talked about using. And whenever you're going to
drop money from a helicopter, the question is, where
do you drop it? And they think they should drop
it into an already broken banking system. The point of this video and the
last is maybe you should just drop it into a new banking
system, or maybe you just drop it into everyone's
pockets and see what happens. And you let new banks
form where they can. Anyway, that's all
for this video. I know it was a little
bit rambling. But hopefully you learned
a little bit. See you in the next video.